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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES POLICY ISSUES




This essay, a summary of remarks delivered at the 2010 Ben J. Althei-
mer Symposium at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H.
Bowen School of Law on prisoners' rights, aims to outline some of the key
issues in the debates over the rights of alleged terrorists detained in the
United States' conflict with Al Qaeda. The detention practices implemented
by the United States are governed by the text of relevant United States sta-
tutes and case law interpreting those texts.' In addition, courts may look to
the international law of war; however, these laws do not have controlling
force in United States courts.
In January 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit decided Al-Bihani v. Obama.2 The court held that "[t]he international
laws of war as a whole have not been implemented domestically by Con-
gress and are therefore not a source of authority for U.S. courts."3 The court
reasoned that "[t]here is no indication in the [Authorization for Use of Mili-
tary Force] AUMF,4 the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 5 or the [Military
Commissions Act] MCA of 2006 or 2009,6 that Congress intended the inter-
national laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for the Presi-
dent's war powers under the AUMF."7 Moreover, "[elven assuming Con-
gress had at some earlier point implemented the laws of war as domestic law
through appropriate legislation, Congress had the power to authorize the
President in the AUMF and other later statutes to exceed those bounds."' In
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson
School of Law.
1. See AL-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 866.
3. Id. at 871 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111(3), (4) (1987)).
4. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
5. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739,2741-43 (2005).
6. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
7. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871.
8. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1 15(1)(a) (1987)).
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addition, "the international laws of war are not a fixed code . .. ."9 "There-
fore, while the international laws of war are helpful to courts when identify-
ing the general set of war powers to which the AUMF speaks, their lack of
controlling legal force and firm definition render their use both inapposite
and inadvisable when courts seek to determine the limits of the President's
war powers."' Therefore, according to recent precedent, United States de-
tention law is separate and apart from the international law of war and is the
only law that has controlling force in United States courts.
II. How Do WE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DIFFERENT CLASSES OF
DETAINEES?
A. International Law
International law recognizes three classes of detainees: prisoners of war
(P.O.W.), protected persons, and others. Article 4 of the Third Geneva Con-
vention sets forth the requirements for prisoner of war status, and the list is
exhaustive." "Protected persons" is defined by Article 4 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention as "those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands
of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nation-
als.""2 Paragraph 2 of Article 4 excludes from this definition nationals of a
co-belligerent state. In addition, nationals of neutral states in the home terri-
tory of a party to the conflict, so long as the neutral state "has normal dip-
lomatic representation in the state in whose hands they are."' 13 This exclusion
does not apply to nationals of neutral states who find themselves in occupied
territory. 4 Such individuals qualify as protected persons irrespective of the
status of diplomatic relations between their state of nationality and the "state
in whose hands they are."' 5
There is limited guidance in the Third Geneva Convention regarding
status determinations.
9. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmt. b, c (1987) (stating there is "no precise formula" to identify a practice as
custom and that "[i]t is often difficult to determine when [a custom's] transformation into law
has taken place")).
10. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality)).
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention, P.O.W.s].
12. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
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[Article 5] directs that should any doubt arise as to whether persons, hav-
ing committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, belong to any of the categories in Article 4 [the applicable article
regarding the persons covered by the Third Geneva Convention], such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal. 16
This rule is subject to manipulation on two fronts: It does not stipulate
which person or entity is entitled to make the decision whether there is any
doubt, and it lacks detail about the nature of the tribunal that will make the
status determination in cases of doubt. 7
Article 45 of Additional Protocol I provides some additional detail re-
garding status determination. First, it allows the detained person, or the
state party on whom he depends.., to claim prisoner of war status, the-
reby allowing him or her to raise the issue and require a tribunal to be
held before the status could be denied. Second, Article 45 grants any in-
dividual being tried for an offense arising from hostilities the right to li-
tigate the issue of his or her entitlement to prisoner of war status ... be-
fore a "judicial tribunal." Finally, it provides that even if prisoner of war
status is denied, the individual is still entitled to protections of Article 75
of Additional Protocol I, which applies to all persons detained in connec-
tion with an armed conflict subject to Additional Protocol 1.18
However, Additional Protocol I is subject to the same manipulation as the
Third Geneva Convention because it too fails to "provide any detail regard-
ing the nature of the tribunal or the procedure it is to follow in making status
determinations."' 9
B. United States Law and Policy
Although the United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I, it has
implemented Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention in a manner that
provides more due process protections than is required by the Third Geneva
Convention or Additional Protocol I."° United States law differentiates be-
16. James A. Schoettler, Jr., Detention of Combatants and the Global War on Terror, in
MICHAEL W. LEwis, THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE
67, 87 (2009) (citing Geneva Convention, P.O.W.s, supra note 11).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 88 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1977)
[hereinafter Protocol] ("Article 75 ensure[s] that the detained individual [still] retains certain
protections under international law even if he or she is determined to be a combatant who is
not entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war")).
19. Id. at 89 (citing Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 45).
20. Id. at 90.
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tween lawful and unlawful enemy combatants. Those persons falling within
the former category are afforded P.O.W. status and the protections of the
Third Geneva Convention.21 The MCA of 2006 defines unlawful combatant
as:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person
who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or (ii) a per-
son who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy
combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent
tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary
of Defense.22
This definition "indicate[s] that persons who materially support a ter-
rorist group need not actually commit belligerent acts in order to be treated
as enemy combatants. ' '23 Those persons falling within this category are not
afforded the protections provided by the Geneva Conventions.24 For the pur-
poses of determining whether members of al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups should be treated as combatants, the United States has adopted a
broad definition that includes persons who are either "part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or its coalition partners and engaged in an
armed conflict against the United States., 25 "This definition has been
adopted by United States courts in evaluating combatant status determina-
tions."26
21. Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, United States Dep't of Def., Gen. Coun-
sel, to Members of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable (Dec. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/5312/enemycombatants.html [hereinafter Haynes Memoran-
dum].
22. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948q(a)(l)-(2), 120 Stat.
26000 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
23. Schoettler, Jr., supra note 16, at 80.
24. Haynes Memorandum, supra note 2 1.
25. Schoettler, Jr., supra note 16, at 79 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 543 U.S. 507, 517
(2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality)).
26. Id. (citing Bounediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.C. 2008) (setting forth
combatant definition for use in habeas corpus proceedings)).
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III. PROCESS OF DETENTION
A. International Law
Under the Geneva Conventions, a State may detain an individual who
is either a prisoner of war,27 protected person,2s or other combatant. Accord-
ing to international human rights law, a state may detain an individual as a
security detainee, so long as the grounds for detention are not arbitrary and
are based on grounds previously established by law.29
Whether a detainee may challenge his detention depends on the detai-
nee's status. For prisoners of war, there is no express requirement under the
Third Geneva Convention to allow for an opportunity to appeal status de-
terminations or to provide any subsequent review of whether continued de-
tention is necessary.30 If the detainee is a civilian detainee, then the Fourth
Geneva Convention requires that he be permitted to appeal his detention,
with such appeal to be decided "with the least possible delay."'', Further, if
the decision to detain is upheld, "it shall be subject to periodical review, if
possible every six (6) months, by a competent body set up by the [Occupy-
ing] Power.,
32
B. United States Law
The power to detain cannot be narrower than the power of a military
commission to prosecute.33 The AUMF authorizes the President to "use all
27. See Geneva Convention, P.O.W.s, supra note 11, at art. 21.
28. See Geneva Convention, Civilian Protection, supra note 12, at art. 42.
29. Doug Cassel, International Human Rights Law and Security Detention, 40 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 383, 384 (2009). Professor Cassel derived the elements of the IHRL consen-
sus on security detention, in part, from (1) International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M 368, (Dec. 16, 1966); (2) Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/180 (Dec.
12, 1948); and (3) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res., 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 93d plen. mtg., (Dec. 10,
1984). Id. at 385.
30. Schoettler, Jr., supra note 16, at 85 (citing Geneva Convention, Civilian Protection,
supra note 12, at art. 5).
31. Id. (citing Geneva Convention, Civilian Protection, supra note 12, at art. 5).
32. Id. (citing Geneva Convention, Civilian Protection, supra note 12, at art. 5). A simi-
lar right can be found in Article 43, regarding alien enemies detained in a State's home terri-
tory.
33. In fact, this power is probably broader. See also Schoettler, Jr., supra note 16, at 80-
81 (citing Respondent's Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation,
Misc. No. 08-422, 5-6 (TFH) (Mar. 13, 2009) (arguing that the authorization of force granted
in the AUMF necessarily includes the authority to detain under the law of war and reasoning
that this authority permits the detention of anyone who was "part of' the groups targeted by
2010]
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necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or per-
sons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons. 34 In Hamdi, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
"necessary and appropriate force," includes the power to detain combatants
subject to such force.35
In 2006, Congress provided guidance on the class of persons subject to
detention under the AUMF by defining "unlawful enemy combatants" who
can be tried by military commissions as
those who are engaged in hostilities or who [have] purposefully and ma-
terially supported hostilities or who [have] purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who
[are] not lawful enemy combatant[s] (including [persons] who [are] part
of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces).36
In 2009, Congress enacted a new version of the MCA with a new defi-
nition that authorized the trial of "unprivileged enemy belligerents," which
includes those persons who "purposefully and materially supported hostili-
ties against the United States or its coalition partners."37 Therefore, under
United States detention law, the President, at minimum, has the power to
detain those persons whom military commissions have the power to prose-
cute under MCA 2006 and 2009.
Whether a detainee may invoke habeas to challenge his detention de-
pends on the detainee's nationality, where he committed his crimes, and the
type of detention facility in which he is being held. In Hirota v. MacArthur,
the Supreme Court held that habeas jurisdiction does not exist where the
detainees are foreign nationals who are held by a foreign military tribunal-
even where the tribunal was set up, in part, by the United States.38 Converse-
ly, in Munafv. Geren, the Supreme Court held that habeas jurisdiction exists
the AUMF just as the law of war permits detention of any member of an enemy armed
force)).
34. AI-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Authorization for
Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)).
35. Id. at 872 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plu-
rality)).
36. Id. at 872 (citing Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §
948a(l)(A)(i), 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2241)).
37. Id. (citing Military Commissions Act of 2009 sec. 1802, §§ 948a(7), 948b(a), 948(c),
Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit.18, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575-76).
38. 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948). The military tribunal set up in Japan by General MacAr-
thur, as the agent of the Allied powers, is not a tribunal of the United States and the courts of
the United States have no power or authority to review, affirm, set aside, or annul the judg-
ments and sentences imposed by it on these petitioners, all of whom are residents and citizens
of Japan. Id.
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under section 2241(c)(1) of title 28 of the United States Code, where the
detainees are American citizens, held by American forces, who answer only
to an American chain of command.39 However, the detainees at issue were
found not to be entitled to habeas relief 4 The Court reasoned that Iraq had a
sovereign right to prosecute the detainees for crimes allegedly committed in
Iraq and habeas could not be used to defeat the criminal jurisdiction of a
foreign sovereign. 4' This was held to be true even if application of that sove-
reign's laws would allegedly violate the United States Constitution.42 Lastly,
the Court held that the detainees' claims that their transfer to Iraqi custody
would likely result in torture presented a matter for the political branches,
not the judiciary.43
IV. RELEASE OF DETAINEES
A. International Law
Under the international laws of war, the point in time at which a detai-
nee must be released depends on the detainee's status. If the capturing state
concludes that an individual is an enemy combatant, he or she can be held
until the end of hostilities." Conversely, if the detaining state determines
that the detainee is a civilian, there is no authority under the Geneva Con-
ventions for his indefinite detention.45 Rather, detention may only continue
as long as the situation requires, consistent with the security of the detaining
state.46 Moreover, the detainee must be granted a right of periodic appeal to
determine if detention is still required. 7
B. United States Law
According to Ludecke v. Watkins, the determination of when hostilities
have ceased is a political decision." In the absence of an authoritative con-
gressional declaration purporting to terminate the war, the courts will defer
to the Executive's opinion on the matter.49 In Al-Bihani v. Obama, the D.C.
39. 553 U.S. 674,674-75 (2008).
40. Id. at 688.
41. Id. at 690-91.
42. Id. at 691-92.
43. Id. at 697.
44. Schoettler, Jr., supra note 16, at 86.
45. 1d. at 86 (citing Geneva Convention, Civilian Protection, supra note 12, at art. 5, 42,
& 78).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Geneva Convention, Civilian Protection, supra note 12, at art. 78).
48. 335 U.S. 160, 168-69 & n.14 (1948).
49. AI-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
2010]
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Circuit rejected petitioner's argument that, in the absence of an express
Presidential pronouncement that a war was ongoing, Ludecke v. Watkins
should not be applied." The D.C. Circuit went on to hold that denying the
protections of the Third Geneva Convention to a detainee entitled to P.O.W.
status does not strip the United States of its authority to detain him.5 The
court reasoned that "the AUMF, DTA, and MCA of 2006 and 2009 do not
hinge the government's detention authority on proper identification of
P.O.W.s or compliance with international law in general."52 In fact, in a pro-
vision that was unaltered by the MCA of 2009, the MCA of 2006 explicitly
precludes detainees from claiming the Geneva conventions as a source of
rights. 3
V. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The question of whether United States courts are bound by internation-
al law depends on a number of factors. As a result, significant debate sur-
rounds whether and to what extent United States foreign detention practice
is consistent with international detention law. Some argue that the United
States practice is inconsistent with the international laws governing deten-
tion, particularly European detention practice. 4 According to these com-
mentators, if security detention is to be allowed at all, it should only be per-
mitted by derogation from international law standards.55 Thus, the standard
that should be applied to security detention should be no less than a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 6 In this circumstance, security detention is not
preferred, and therefore, if it is to be allowed, "its use [should] be kept to an
absolute minimum and subjected to rigorous and redundant procedural safe-
guards."
57
50. Id. at 875. ("A clear statement requirement is at odds with the wide deference the
judiciary is obliged to give to the democratic branches with regard to questions concerning
national security. In the absence of a determination by the political branches that hostilities in
Afghanistan have ceased, [the defendant's] continued detention is justified.").
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5(a), 120 Stat.
26000 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2241)). The court goes on to say that, although Justice
Souter's separate opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 553 (Souter, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment), does discuss a "clean hands" theory,
this theory finds no support in law.
54. Douglass Cassel, Pretrial and Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Options
and Constraints Under International Law, 98 J. CRim. L. & CRiMNOLOGY 811, 817 (2008).
55. Id. at 851.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 852.
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Others argue for limiting the current United States detention methods
by noting that the United States government has only avoided applying the
law by misnaming those being held as detainees.5" For example, according
to Professor Honigsberg, the United States government unilaterally rede-
fined international humanitarian law (as expressed by the Geneva Conven-
tions) by renaming lawful and unlawful combatants as "enemy combatants"
after 9/11 to avoid providing such combatants with certain protections.5 9
Honigsberg highlights that the government has proliferated inconsistent
definitions of "enemy combatant," beginning with the introduction of the
term in 2002, up until the MCA, for the first time, statutorily defined the
term.60 Finally, Honigsberg concludes that the government conceived the
term "enemy combatant" specifically to avoid accepted norms and standards
of international and constitutional law; thus, current United States detention
practice is not only out of sync with international law, but also with its
own.
6 1
Despite these arguments, security detention persists and detainees are
still referred to as "enemy combatants." Therefore, at least for the time be-
ing, the administration appears satisfied that its procedures are either consis-
tent with international law or international law need not be strictly applied to
the "new" circumstance of alleged terrorists.
58. Peter Jan Honigsberg, Chasing "Enemy Combatants" and Circumventing Interna-
tional Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 1-6
(2007).
59. Id. at 22-46.
60. Id. at 46-70 (reviewing letters and memoranda issued by Pentagon Counsel William
J. Haynes II, documents and publications issued by the DOD, and reports, orders, and state-
ments issued by the Bush administration along with the administration's reliance on Ex Parte
Quirin and the Court's failure to impact the legitimacy and application of the term in Hamdi
and Hamdan).
61. Id. at 70-73.
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